Sidmanrejectsequivalencing, relational frames,and mediationas acceptable means of accounting for stimulusrelationsandasserts that thereis sufficientexplanationin the observation that "equivalence relationsin behavior are instances of the classthat elementarymathematical set theory describes" (p. 558). Sidman argues that the parallelsbetweenequivalence relationsandelementarymathematical settheory(whichincludes theconcepts of identity,symmetry, andtransitivity) are sufficientto their explanation(p. 553). But he also recognizes that although "Elementarymathematical set theorydescribes the abstract properties of equivalence relations"andis of valuein determining whether"any particular eventpair belongsto an equivalencerelation,it is silentaboutthe origin of equivalencerelations themselves"(p. 553).
Sidmanalsoappropriately observes, however, thattestsfor equivalence relationsdo not constitutedefinitionsof their requisitesor an explanationof them. They only declaretheir existence.He rejectsmediational theories as awkwardandconsiders themto be "inelegant"effortsthatrely uponvery fragile props.For instance, he argues that mediationai theorycould not accountfor AB andBC symmetrywith-out "acceptingtherealityof backward conditioning,"which at bestis an uncommonphenomenon or mechanism (p. 380).
Sidman, in the final analysis, attributesthe originsof equivalence to the naturalprocesses of reinforcement (p. 553). But one might well ask, reinforcement of what? There is no "equivalence"responsein the traditional senseto be reinforcedduring training. Although equivalencerelationsdo emerge, they areneitherobviouslynordirectlyreinforcedassuch duringtraining,duringwhichtime other very specificresponses are,indeed, selectively reintbrced.
The Is it necessary to posit thatif there has been learning,there must have beenreinforcement? If onecan't find the reinforcer, asin observational (not imitativeor copycat)learning, is it defensibleto insistthatit mustbesomething,somewhere? I don't think so.To do so cankeepus from observingand understanding still other aspectsof learningandbehaviorchange.
The evidenceis overwhelmingthat humans, andat leastsomenonhuman species, can learn from first-instance opportunitiesto observe.They can learnby watchingothersdothingsand by perceiving the flow of eventsacross time,therebyestablishing stimulusrelationsthat are subjectto differential recallanddifferentialaction.In short, if Sidrnanis correctin attributingthe formationof equivalence relationsto natural contingencies of reinforcement, thenreinforcement will haveto bedefined as somethingmore ubiquitous and subtle than are the eventsand items of reinforcement that are discretelydispensed in the operantlaboratory.
The animal researchliterature is nowrepletewith a rich arrayof studies that portray emergentrelations betweenstimuli that, in turn, allow for the competentuse of languageand numbers in apes (Rumbaugh, in press; Rumbaugh & Savage-Rumbaugh, 1994, for a review; Savage-Rumbaugh, 1986; Savage-Rumbaugh & Lewin, 1994) andevenin "insightful" problemsolving by birds. All psychologists, even goingbackto K6hler,acknowledge the critical influenceof contextandexpe- 
